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H I G H L I G H T S  
• Pairing solar PV with battery can reduce electricity imports from the grid by up to 84%. 
• Home battery doubles PV self-consumption in the building. 
• Rewarding self-consumption of PV is the most effective policy for mobilizing onsite flexibility solutions like batteries. 
• Solar PV paired with battery can be profitable for residential consumers even in high-latitude countries. 
• Value of arbitrage for residential electricity storage can be three times higher than utility-scale storage.  
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A B S T R A C T   
Share of solar photovoltaic (PV) is rapidly growing worldwide as technology costs decline and national energy 
policies promote distributed renewable energy systems. Solar PV can be paired with energy storage systems to 
increase the self-consumption of PV onsite, and possibly provide grid-level services, such as peak shaving and 
load levelling. However, the investment on energy storage may not return under current market conditions. We 
propose three types of policies to incentivise residential electricity consumers to pair solar PV with battery 
energy storage, namely, a PV self-consumption feed-in tariff bonus; “energy storage policies” for rewarding 
discharge of electricity from home batteries at times the grid needs most; and dynamic retail pricing mechanisms 
for enhancing the arbitrage value of residential electricity storage. We soft-link a consumer cost optimization 
model with a national power system model to analyse the impact of the proposed policies on the economic 
viability of PV-storage for residential end-users in the UK. The results show that replacing PV generation in-
centives with a corresponding PV self-consumption bonus offers return on investment in a home battery, equal to 
a 70% capital subsidy for the battery, but with one-third of regulatory costs. The proposed energy storage policies 
offer positive return on investment of 40% when pairing a battery with solar PV, without the need for central 
coordination of decentralized energy storage nor providing ancillary services by electricity storage in buildings. 
We find that the choice of optimal storage size and dynamic electricity tariffs are key to maximize the profit-
ability of PV-battery energy storage systems.   
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Energy transitions worldwide seek to increase the share of low- 
carbon energy solutions mainly based on renewable energy. Variable 
renewable energy (VRE), namely solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind, have 
been the pillars of renewable energy transitions [1]. To cope with the 
temporal and spatial variability of VRE, a set of flexibility options have 
been proposed to match energy supply and demand reliably [2]. Elec-
trical energy storage (EES)1 systems are one of the flexibility options that 
can contribute to, inter alia, the integration of high shares of VRE [3], 
minimizing the need for fossil fuel-based peak generation and backup 
power capacity [4], decreasing carbon emissions [5], and reducing 
electricity prices and price volatility [6]. 
With ever declining capital cost of solar PV, many governments 
promote distributed solar PV generation as one of the key energy tech-
nologies in energy transitions. Residential solar PV has grown signifi-
cantly globally, with an annual average growth rate of about 50% 
between 2010 and 2020 [7]. In this respect, government subsidies have 
encouraged many households to install roof-top solar PV in different 
countries [1]. PV generation in high-latitude countries does not 
completely coincide with the household electricity demand [8], calling 
for options such as the export of excess PV generation to the grid or 
onsite storage. To increase the self-consumption of PV and reduce 
possible grid contingencies in peak PV generation, EES can be effectively 
employed to shift generation from PV from off-peak to peak demand 
times, reducing system-wide generation costs and potentially avoiding 
the need for network reinforcement [9]. The value of EES for the system 
will grow as solar PV deployment rate increases [10] and the cost of EES 
declines [11]. However, the cost of distributed EES is typically higher 
than the benefits that it can offer to prosumers2 under current market 
conditions [12], leaving the deployment rate of distributed EES com-
bined with PV very low [13]. 
1.2. Policies for promoting PV and storage: economic considerations 
Different policy options have been employed to improve the eco-
nomic feasibility of distributed solar PV, with feed-in tariffs (FiTs) being 
the main incentive adopted in many countries in the last decade [14]. 
However, until recently, there has been little or no policy support for 
distributed EES, such as small-scale batteries, which is shown to be a key 
barrier in deploying storage [15] under current policy regimes [16]. 
Supporting distributed renewable generation without adequate in-
centives for onsite flexibility and distributed EES might not fully realize 
the private and system-level benefits of distributed energy generation 
systems [17,18]. Introducing such policy supports can contribute to a 
significant adoption of distributed EES; such as the subsidy mechanism 
for PV paired with EES by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) making homeowners eligible for a capital subsidy when 
installing a home battery [19]. 
The economic feasibility of distributed EES has been subject to a 
wide number of studies with different modelling approaches. Uddin 
et al. [20] examines the feasibility of residential EES by applying a 
battery degradation model, showing no financial benefits and even 
possible economic losses. Zakeri and Syri [21] apply a holistic life cycle 
cost analysis of different EES systems, concluding that the levelized cost 
of storage (LCOS) for most batteries is way too high to be competitive in 
the current electricity markets. Murrant et al. proposes multi-attribute 
value theory to investigate the economic viability of different distrib-
uted EES systems [22]. The economic benefits of battery energy storage 
under different ownership structures are also studied in [23]. The 
reviewed literature commonly conclude that EES systems are not 
generally profitable without policy intervention and removing market 
barriers, e.g., for community-level storage solutions [24], aggregator-led 
coordination of residential EES [12], and qualifying EES for providing 
multiple grid services (revenue stacking) [4,25]. To respond to this gap, 
a number of studies focus on policies that could improve the financial 
case of EES systems. For example, Winfield et al. [17] investigate the 
role of EES policies in Canada, EU, and the US; Zakeri and Syri [26,27] 
show the benefits of EES from day-ahead, intra-day, and balancing 
markets in different Nordic countries; and Zakeri et al. [28] compare 
potential benefits of EES from energy arbitrage and the reserve markets 
in Germany. These studies highlight the role of the aggregation of 
benefits as a key policy support for promoting EES, but without using a 
model-based quantification of the impact of such policies. 
There are few studies that investigate policies that could improve the 
value of distributed PV-EES systems to residential end-users by quanti-
fication of the impact of such policies. Zhang et al. [29] explore the 
payback period of investing in integrated PV-EES systems for different 
building types and locations in the US under different financial in-
centives and carbon prices. The study suggests a payback period of 
11–29 years depending on the location and policy. In [30], the value of 
EES to a private owner in the UK is calculated based on the possibility of 
multiple-service provision, also known as “aggregation of benefits” or 
“revenue stacking”. The study shows that advanced pricing schemes, 
such as time-of-use (ToU) tariffs and aggregation of benefits can enhance 
the value of EES in PV-EES systems. In a more recent study, Gardiner 
et al. [31] compare different policies and quantifies the impact of each 
policy on financial profitability of a PV-EES system in the UK. The study 
shows the importance of aggregation of benefits, and those policies that 
remove the barriers for EES owners to provide multiple storage services 
to the grid. Weniger et al. [32] calculates the optimal size of a PV-battery 
system with detailed representation of the system at the end user side 
and considering a high temporal resolution using one-minute timeseries 
data. The study suggests the policy intervention is needed to guide the 
consumer in optimal sizing of their asset. Last but not least, Stephan 
et al. [33] explore policy options that can promote the aggregation of the 
benefits of EES in Germany, concluding that if the policy focus should be 
guided towards the removal of barriers for such revenue aggregation. In 
Section 1.3, we explain our modelling approach for the quantification of 
energy storage policies, compared to the reviewed literature. 
1.2.1. Solar PV self-consumption policies 
Initial incentives for residential solar PV were mainly rewarding 
solar PV generation, or the export of excess solar PV generation to the 
grid, or a combination of both. A review of such policies by International 
Energy Agency (IEA) [34] shows that the self-consumption of solar PV 
has been poorly rewarded in many countries, leading to an indirect 
incentive for householders to export their PV overproduction to the grid. 
In some cases, this has led to inefficient public expenditure, e.g., by 
rewiring of the PV system to the distribution grid instead of onsite usage 
in Spain. In a few countries, like China, the self-consumption is directly 
incentivized, which can encourage consumers to reduce their de-
pendency on the grid. As the share of decentralized solar PV increases in 
the grid and PV subsidies phasing out in many countries, it is a crucial 
policy concern to encourage prosumers to increase their self- 
consumption rather exporting to the grid. The EU Renewable Energy 
Directive (2018/2001) has explicitly asked Member States to look for 
policies to increase “renewable energy self-consumption” in buildings 
through storage and other options [35]. In Germany, the solar PV FiT 
system may discontinue soon after reaching the goal of 52 GW total 
installed capacity. As consumer electricity prices are high in Germany 
and the cost of battery is declining, a significant uptake of solar PV with 
1 In this paper, the term EES, electricity storage, and storage have been used 
alternatively for technologies like batteries that can store electrical energy and 
discharge it at any desirable time when needed.  
2 The term “prosumer” in this paper reflects those residential electricity 
consumers who own electricity generation, either with or without storage 
technologies. 
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battery systems has happened in recent years, e.g., 65,000 home PV- 
batteries installed only in 2019 [36]. 
A few studies have analysed the impact of PV self-consumption in-
centives on the distribution grid [37] and the integration of PV-storage 
systems [38]. Dehler et al. [39] shows that self-consumption policies 
cannot be successful without prosumers being able to adopt energy 
storage or other demand side flexibility. Pairing PV with battery 
significantly increases the self-consumption of PV but reduces the im-
ports from and exports to the grid (see Fig. 1). Hence, effective policies 
are needed to promote solar PV self-consumption with batteries. We 
explore the impact of such policies in this paper. 
1.3. Contribution of this study 
In the reviewed literature in Section 1.2, distributed PV-EES systems 
are commonly modelled stand alone, i.e., without modelling PV-EES 
integrated or linked with the rest of the power system. This lack of 
representation of distributed PV-EES within the overarching power 
system leads to two major shortcomings in such studies: (i) assuming 
exogenous, commonly fixed, electricity prices throughout the lifetime of 
distributed PV-EES systems, and (ii) considering PV-EES systems as price 
taker technologies. Assuming fixed electricity prices for the lifetime of a 
distributed PV-EES system – a period spanning between 20 and 30 years 
– may overlook the impact of the transition in the power system on 
electricity prices and price volatility [40]. As the share of VRE grows in 
the power generation mix, the gap between peak and off-peak electricity 
prices in different days of the year will change, and as such, the potential 
revenues of a PV-EES system. Missing this transition in the modelling of 
a PV-EES system can lead to underestimation of the contribution of EES 
in high VRE systems. 
On the other hand, assuming a distributed PV-EES system as price 
taker, neglects the impact of storage on the market, including the 
smoothening effect of EES on peak prices in the power system, which is 
observed in different studies [41]. This may lead to the overestimation 
of the benefits of PV-EES systems as penetration of EES in the system has 
a self-competing effect – the higher installed capacity of EES in a given 
system, the lower price gap between peak and off-peak hours. To address 
this gap, we model a distributed PV-EES system linked with a national 
electricity dispatch model. Hence, we estimate future electricity prices 
during the lifetime of PV-EES internally consistent with the rate of 
deployment of residential PV-EES in the overarching power system. 
This paper aims to answer the following questions:  
(i) Is investing in residential PV-EES profitable under current market 
conditions, i.e., without incentives for EES?  
(ii) What support policies can enhance the profitability of stand- 
alone EES or PV-EES systems for residential electricity 
consumers?  
(iii) What is the system (or regulatory) cost of each PV-EES policy 
compared to the benefit of that policy for residential consumers 
who invest in these technologies? 
We propose a few new storage policies, which aim to reward the 
operation of residential storage for increasing solar PV self- 
consumption, peak shaving, and load levelling. The policies proposed 
in this study are based on designing new retail electricity tariffs com-
bined with new policies that reward the discharge of electricity from 
home batteries at times the system needs that most. We compare the 
proposed policies with traditional policies such as capital subsidies or 
export-to-grid FiTs. We show that the joint profitability of PV-EES im-
proves significantly under proposed storage policies, compared to 
common financial incentives for distributed energy technologies. We 
analyse this using the historical data of the UK power system as a case 
study. The UK power system is chosen as it has a high share of solar PV 
installations with feed-in and export tariffs, while no similar incentives 
for EES. Since this situation prevails in many countries worldwide, the 
findings of this study can potentially inform energy policy in other 
countries with large-scale deployment of distributed PV and the need for 
EES for balancing the demand and supply. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the methods and data. Results are presented in Section 3. Policy 
implications are presented in Section 4, with discussing one alternative 
policy for using electric vehicles (EVs) with vehicle to grid (V2G) ca-
pabilities for residential energy storage combined with PV. Concluding 
remarks are summarized in Section 5. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Modelling framework 
We estimate the private value of an investment in PV-EES for a 
typical residential consumer, considering a period of 26 year3 for the 
analysis based on the lifetimes of EES and PV systems. We consider the 
consumer’s annual cost of electricity and demonstrate the profitability 
Fig. 1. Solar PV generation, self-consumption onsite, overproduction (surplus PV), and export to the grid for (a) a typical PV installation compared to (b) a PV- 
storage system. 
3 The lifetime of 26 years, covering 2015–2040, is chosen because the life-
time of solar PV panels is estimated between 25–30 years. Also, the future 
energy scenarios used as the basis for this analysis are developed by National 
Grid through to 2040. The solar PV panels may be still useable after 25–26 
years with a lower capacity [55], but there is no FiT after 26 years. We assume 
no recycling revenues for the owner at the end of the useful lifetime of solar PV 
and battery. 
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of a capital investment in PV-EES by the aid of the linkage of a national- 
level electricity system dispatch model with a consumer PV-EES in-
vestment model. The modelling method in this study is based on the 
following main steps:  
I. Future national-level energy scenarios, including capacities of 
renewables and thermal power plants through to 2040, are based 
on four pathways developed by the UK National Grid [42]. These 
pathways are derived in a multi-stakeholder process, showing 
different futures for the UK energy system based on different 
socio-economic assumptions, such as level of sustainability, 
consumer engagement and economic growth. We derive elec-
tricity generation installed capacities, fuel prices and electricity 
demand in each year of the modelling horizon, i.e., 2015–2040, 
from these scenarios.  
II. A national electricity dispatch model is employed to model the 
hourly operation of the power system using capacities and de-
mand from (I). The dispatch model calculates hourly wholesale 
electricity prices for different years under different scenarios.  
III. The wholesale electricity prices are fed into a retail electricity 
model to calculate consumer prices based on static, time of use 
(ToU), and dynamic tariffs. This is conducted for each year in 
2015–2040.  
IV. A distributed PV-EES optimization model is developed to yield 
the most profitable operational strategy for a consumer with the 
objective of reducing consumer electricity costs. 
Fig. 2 shows the modelling framework applied for our analysis and 
the flow of data between the models. In the following Section, we 
describe each part of this integrated modelling approach in more details. 
2.2. Input data and assumptions 
2.2.1. National-level electricity system model 
We derive wholesale electricity prices from the Electricity System 
Management Model (ESMA), an hourly model consisting of explicitly 
modelled domestic, commercial, and industrial electricity consumers. 
The model has been applied previously to model the operation and 
dispatch of the UK power system, linked with consumer investments in 
distributed energy technologies in different studies [12,43]. The system 
operator optimizes flexible demand and other flexibility options at the 
supply side with the objective of minimizing the total system costs. 
Based on National Grid [42], storage needs are procured partly by 
central EES and another by consumers who own small-scale EES. 
National Grid has developed four future scenarios for the UK, namely 
No Progression (with no significant transition to renewables), Slow 
Progression (resembling business as usual), Green Ambition (sustain-
ability scenario), and Consumer Power (representing the active role of 
consumers in adopting new technologies). In our analysis, we take the 
mean installed capacity of different electricity generation modes and 
EES, between No Progression and Consumer Power scenarios to repre-
sent a plausible evolution of the system in terms of future green ambition 
and economic prosperity (see more details on these scenarios in [42]). 
2.2.2. Electricity tariffs 
Based on calculated wholesale electricity prices from the electricity 
dispatch model, we derive retail prices by considering a real-time mark- 
up over marginal costs (see Appendix A for more details on calculation 
of retail prices). These prices are then calibrated using historical data 
form three electricity tariffs. UK National Statistics [44] provide na-
tional averages, including static tariffs of 0.15 £/kWh, and ToU tariffs 
based on the UK program Economy7 with an off-peak (24–7 h) tariff of 
0.07 £/kWh and an on-peak (7–24 h) of 0.16 £/kWh. Assuming con-
sumers use smart meters, we also consider real-time tariffs to understand 
whether they could better reflect the value of EES in energy time shift-
ing. To provide a direct comparison of electricity costs under ToU and 
real-time tariffs, we assume that both have the same daily mean. Static 
and ToU tariffs are assumed to vary quarterly, and real-time tariffs vary 
continuously on an hourly basis with the wholesale price. 
2.2.3. Residential solar PV with energy storage 
We model the hourly operation of solar PV and a battery energy 
storage technology for a residential consumer with a medium-sized, 
three-bedroom dwelling with an annual electricity consumption of 
Fig. 2. Modelling framework applied in this paper with the flow of data between different models and calculation modules.  
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3750 kWh (the average of 3084–4399 kWh/a), as a potential adopter of 
solar PV and EES, which is considered a standard consumer based on UK 
Electricity Survey Data [45] and National Statistics [44]. Later, in Sec-
tion 3.6.1, we analyse the results for different buildings with different 
load data to cover a wider range of buildings. The hourly time-of-day 
load data of the residential consumers for each season and day are ob-
tained from Elexon [46]. Then, the data are populated for the entire year 
(8760 h) and scaled relative to the country-wide average load in each 
season and day (365 d) based on the hourly data from ENTSOE [47]. As a 
result, we generate hourly load profiles for a residential consumer for 
each year (8760 h). The solar PV generation in cases where the con-
sumer operates a solar PV system is dependent on the latitude 
(geographical location). In our main analysis, we use the hourly solar PV 
generation for a location in London, based on simulated data from Re-
newables.ninja.4 The yearly capacity factor for solar PV in the selected 
location is between 12 and 13% in 2016–2019. In Section 3.6.2, we 
reproduce the results for five different locations across the country with 
different solar PV generation data to understand the impact of the 
geographical location on the results. 
We analyse the consumer technology options based on four different 
cases. First, we consider a consumer who owns neither EES nor a solar 
PV system, i.e., “-no-technology” case. We simulate the consumer’s 
hourly load profile based on national data of annual load and hourly 
load pattern [48]. Then, we consider a case called “storage-only”, in 
which the consumer installs a battery energy storage, but without solar 
PV onsite. The storage-only case is to explore the benefits of storage for 
price arbitrage (load management) without having PV installed. Next, 
we analyse the case of a consumer with solar PV but without storage, 
called “PV-only”. This consumer benefits from additional revenues from 
solar PV generation and export to grid (hereafter called export) feed-in 
tariffs (FiTs). Finally, we consider the case of “PV-storage”, in which the 
consumer operates both solar PV and storage onsite. Here, storage can 
be used to increase the solar PV self-consumption as well as price arbi-
trage (shifting load from peak to off-peak), with the objective of mini-
mizing the consumer’s electricity bill. 
We model consumer financial case between 2015 and 2040. This way 
we account for year-to-year changes in some of input parameters such as 
tariffs. The solar PV FiT starts with 0.049 £/kWh of electricity generated 
and declines on an annual basis based on [48]. The export tariff of 0.043 
£/kWh is guaranteed for 20 years – increasing by the retail price index 
(RPI) of 3.4% per year. For scenarios with solar PV, the consumer 
operates a 4-kW system, while for storage a battery of 6.4 kWh–3.3 kW is 
taken into account. This is equivalent to the size of Tesla Powerwall I 
Table 1 
Main modelling assumptions and input parameters of consumer technologies and tariffs.   
Parameter Value Note Source of data 
Consumer Annual load 3750 kWh/a fixed throughout the analysis except in Section 3.6.1 for sensitivity analysis [45]  
Building type 3 bedrooms Terrace or private house [45]  
Location London area fixed throughout the analysis except in Section 3.6.2 for sensitivity analysis   
Load profile Domestic class 1 
(unrestricted) 
seasonal and time-of-day residential electricity load profiles from Elexon [46] are 
populated for the entire year (8760 h), then scaled relative to the country-wide average 
load in each season and day obtained from ENTSOE for each examined year (2016–2019)  
[47] 
[46] and [47] 
Electricity tariffs Static 0.15 £/kWh varying year to year based on yearly average of wholesale electricity prices [44]  
Time of use (ToU) off-peak: 0.07 £/kWh 
peak: 0.16 £/kWh 
- off-peak hours between 0 and 7 and peak hours 7–24 
- varying yearly based on average wholesale electricity prices 
[44]  
Real-time 3.22 times hourly 
prices 
- a 3.22 premium for taxes and levies applied to wholesale electricity prices [44] 
Solar PV Investment cost 1813–1866a £/kW cost data for small modules (0–4 kW), including installation costs. UK official 
statistics [49]  




1000 £ an average value between 500-1500 £. [50]  
Inverter 
replacement period 
10 year  [50]  
O&M cost 20 £/kW/a including full-scope O&M cost and a small premium for home insurance [51,52]  
Lifetime 26 year based on estimation of 80% degradation rate after 25–26 year [53]  
FiT generation 0.0491 £/kWh - declining on an annual basis and lasting until 2040 [48]  
FiT export to grid 0.043 £/kWh - guaranteed for 20 years starting 2016, adjusted with the consumer price index. [48]  
Hourly generation  based on simulated data from website: renewables.ninja [54] 
Battery energy 
storage 
Investment cost of 
battery 
712 £/kWh - average value of the market price of Tesla Powerwall. 
- Including 20% VAT and installation cost. 
[55]  
Power rating 3.3b kW both for charge and discharge (based on Tesla Powerwall I) [55]  
Storage size 6.4b kWh both for charge and discharge (based on Tesla Powerwall I) [55]  
Round-trip 
efficiency 
92.5% at nominal depth of discharge and excluding battery self-discharge [22]  
Self-discharge 0.5% per hour considering losing 80% of full charge after one week if unused   
Lifetime 13 year based on warranty time for 80% capacity (or 5000 discharge cycles) [55]  
Replacement cost 213 £/kWh estimation of replacement cost in 2030 (30% of capital cost today) [11] 
Economic 
assumptions 
Discount rate 5.1% based on a hurdle rate of 5.1–5.6 for small-scale solar PV projects [56]  
Lifetime of analysis 26 year based on lifetime of technologies and available FiTs modelling 
horizon  
Retail price index 
(RPI) 
+3.2% per year used for changing tariffs over time [48]  
a Based on UK official statistics “solar PV cost data”. The higher cost is for 2016 and the lower cost for 2019. 
b Fixed throughout the analysis except for the optimal sizing in Section 3.6.3. 
4 Renewables.ninja converts solar irradiance from satellite reanalysis data 
into power output using the Global Solar Energy Estimator model presented in 
[56]. For more information: https://www.renewables.ninja/ 
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batteries in the market. The consumer solar PV generation and load vary 
hourly, monthly, and seasonally. Hence, the PV-EES optimization model 
helps consumer capture energy time-shifting value of EES, resulting in 
most optimal hourly figures for grid purchases, battery charge level, 
solar consumption, and delayed self-consumption. The main input data 
and assumptions for the consumer PV-EES model is summarized in 
Table 1. 
We propose a simple PV-EES model for minimizing the households’ 
hourly electricity bill. The optimization model ensures the consumer can 
gain the highest performance from the integrated EES-alone, PV-alone, 
or PV-EES system. The electricity prices are known to the consumer 
before optimizing their onsite technologies. This is a valid assumption 
for static and ToU electricity tariffs. For real-time electricity tariffs 
where electricity prices are a function of the supply and demand in the 
power market, this perfect foresight is not a realistic assumption. 
However, since the battery has a self-discharge rate of 0.5% per hour, 
the modelling approach does not lead to long-term storage. Further 
details on the modelling and optimization strategy of the distributed PV- 
EES system is presented in Appendix B. 
Fig. 3 shows the optimal hourly operation of the consumer’s onsite 
technologies, including the impact of such technologies on electricity 
import from and export to the grid for the four technology options and 
under the time of use (ToU) tariff in three sample days. In this example, 
we show how the operation of storage can be different based on the 
possibility of solar PV generation. In Fig. 3 (b), the battery is mainly used 
for price arbitrage, i.e., charging during the night-time for reducing the 
import from the grid in peak hours. However, in Fig. 3 (d), the battery is 
mainly increasing the solar PV self-consumption, resulting in no imports 
from the grid in the examined period. The operation of solar PV with 
storage will reduce the export to the grid significantly, compared to PV- 
alone (Fig. 3 (c)). As the results show, different technology options re-
sults in a different mode of the operation of EES and interaction between 
the consumer and the grid. Consumers with solar PV alone will export 
the negative residual load to the grid at the FiT export tariff. 
2.3. Investment analysis 
For assessing the financial case of a private consumer adopting 
distributed technologies, we employ different indicators, including 
annualized cost of electricity and technologies, Net Present Value (NPV) 
and Return on Investment (ROI), presented relative to four scenarios 
with the consumer operating: (1) no technology; (2) a battery energy 
storage device; (3) a solar PV system; or (4) both a battery and a solar PV 
system. For each technology adoption scenario, we consider the impact 
of electricity tariffs, namely: (A) static, (B) time-of-use (ToU), and (C) 
real-time5 tariffs. Operational savings are relative to the base case, 
scenario 1A. We use a discount rate of 5.1%, in line with the recom-
mendations of Committee on Climate Change (CCC) [57]. The consumer 
cost optimization model described in Section 2.3.3 derives annual 
electricity costs in each scenario based on available onsite technologies. 
The consumer cost includes the electricity bill as well as the investment 
and management costs of PV and EES technologies. We employ an 
annual resolution and assume no debt financing, with investment costs 
arising in 2016. The consumer accumulates revenues by generating 
electricity from solar PV and/or exporting electricity, a process which 
can be optimized when using a battery to store electricity and release 
when it is economically most feasible to do so (i.e., price arbitrage). 
Based on Table 1, considering installation and equipment costs of 
technologies, the capital cost of EES (~4.6 k£) is 63% that of PV (7.25 k 
£), which is without considering possible replacements of EES during the 
lifetime of analysis. If a consumer decided to use both PV and EES, an 
upfront investment of ~12 k£ would be required. 
2.4. Financial incentives for energy storage 
In this Section, we define the policy scenarios for our modelling and 
analysis. In addition to the Reference scenario, in which a fixed solar PV 
generation and export-to-grid FiT is in place for the analysis period 
(2015–2040), we compare different incentive options. Some of these 
incentive policies are based on already-known mechanisms such as ca-
pacity subsidy and generation FiTs. Moreover, we introduce new dedi-
cated energy storage policies, and test them with other incentives. The 
following discusses these policies, summarized in at the end of Section. 
2.4.1. Eliminating PV generation tariff in favour of self-consumption 
We propose a policy measure that could improve the profitability of 
EES technologies when combined with PV. Because excess solar elec-
tricity will be exported to the grid during low electricity demand pe-
riods, the self-consumption of solar PV is typically low in high-latitude 
countries. The PV generation FiT combined with an export to grid FiT 
has been the main incentive for residential PV in the UK. This resulted in 
a large deployment of small-scale solar PV in the UK until 2019, when 
the regulator discontinued generation FiT for new installations. This 
decision resulted in rapid decline of new PV installations. Rewarding 
solar PV generation alone is not an efficient policy for increasing solar 
PV self-consumption, especially if this payment will be double subsi-
dized with an export tariff. Policy design should incentivize consumers 
to increase their own PV self-consumption when it is useful for the 
system and for the distribution grid, as shown in [37]. More importantly, 
an effective self-consumption policy can incentivize consumers to 
deploy storage options to increase the use of solar energy onsite rather 
than exporting to the grid. As shown in Fig. 1, there are differences 
between self-consumption and export for a typical PV installation for 
PV-only compared with PV-battery. Deploying a battery onsite reduces 
the export to the grid significantly, which results in less income from 
export FiT for the consumer. 
We propose to eliminate the solar PV generation tariff, while 
simultaneously recompensing the PV owners for the subsequent loss of 
FiT payments with an enhanced PV self-consumption tariff. For this 
policy not to negatively impact holders of solar PV alone, who are not 
able to increase their self-consumption without storage, the amount of 
tariff can be designed to maintain the original combined generation and 
export FiT revenues to users with PV alone over the technology’s life-
time (see Appendix E for more details on calculation of self-generation 
tariff. 
2.4.2. Introducing a new storage policy 
We propose a new incentive, called “Storage tariff”, to renumerate 
the operation of EES systems, if this operation contributes to the sys-
temwide load management. This policy is quantified in the form of a FiT, 
payable to storage owners only if their storage device discharges elec-
tricity during certain hours a day, e.g., at peak time. Moreover, any 
charge of electricity to the storage device in the peak time will be 
negatively penalized with the same or different tariff rate. This policy 
should encourage EES owners to optimize their device so that they 
maximize the discharge of electricity during the hours rewarded most by 
the system, e.g., peak time or the time grid contingencies occur, and shift 
charging of storage to off-peak hours or hours with excess solar PV 
generation. This hourly storage tariff, which varies depending on the 
needs of the power system, can be linked to wholesale day-ahead or 
intraday prices (see Appendix D, Eq. D3). 
2.4.3. Capital subsidies 
Capital subsidies are one of the well-established incentive mecha-
nisms for promoting new technologies. For example, the subsidy 
mechanism for PV-EES by California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) rewards storage buyers by a lucrative subsidy of 1000 US$/kWh, 
5 In this paper, the terms “real-time” and “dynamic” tariffs have been used 
interchangeably denoting a retail electricity tariff changing on an hourly basis 
following the wholesale electricity prices in the power market. 
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which could almost cover the investment cost of the battery in 2020 
[58]. We consider how decreasing the cost of batteries through capital 
subsidies affects the financial case for EES. The subsidies are assumed to 
decrease the nominal cost of both purchased batteries by 30%, 60%, and 
90%, with the second battery already costing 70% less than current 
costs. 
2.4.4. Price-gap widening policy 
Lastly, we introduce a new electricity pricing policy called “Price-gap 
widening” tariff. In this policy, the system operator purposely increases 
retail electricity prices at peak hours while decreasing off-peak prices for 
consumers. This tariff resembles “critical peak pricing” policies in Japan 
[59], the US [60], or similar tariffs in France, where the system opera-
tors is interested in load levelling due to abundant, low-cost, nuclear 
baseload generation. This tariff not only encourages consumers to shift 
their peak consumption to off-peak hours, but also widens the gap be-
tween off-peak and peak prices, which contributes to the profitability of 
EES from price arbitrage. The optimal operation of residential EES for 
price arbitrage is not dependent on the absolute price of electricity but 
rather on the gap between prices at charging and discharging times. 
However, the increase in peak prices should be done smartly to not 
negatively affect the yearly electricity bills of consumers without EES. 
2.4.4.1. Dynamic storage tariffs. As a variant of our proposed “storage 
tariff”, we analyse a “dynamic storage tariff”, in which the discharge 
tariff for storage is indexed with real-time hourly electricity prices. 
Therefore, as opposed to “storage tariff”, where the payment for 
discharge at peak hours were fixed tariffs, the dynamic storage policy 
rewards storage with higher payments if peak-time prices are high in 
some days and less if peak-time prices plummet. Also, in this policy, the 
retail electricity prices are changed based on the “price-gap widening”. 
Table 2 summarizes the main features and assumptions of the pol-
icies examined in this paper. 
3. Results 
3.1. Impact of storage on annual electricity bills 
Our analysis of consumers’ operating electricity costs shows how a 
consumer’s choice of technology and electricity tariff affects annual 
electricity bills. We find that battery storage can substantially reduce the 
cost of electricity to consumers, and that ToU are the most appropriate 
tariffs to realize the value of EES to consumers in reducing their import 
from the grid. 
3.1.1. Consumer’s choice of technology 
Most UK electricity consumers do not own any energy technology 
and pay static tariffs [61]. Annual bill savings for a user under static 
tariff when adopting different technologies can be seen in Fig. 4. These 
values are without considering the cost of the PV-EES technology, to 
provide a picture on the level of potential savings irrespective of the cost 
of technology. If the household does not operate EES or PV, electricity 
Fig. 3. Optimized operation of battery energy storage under time of use (ToU) electricity tariff and for different technology combinations. In three sample days. a) 
Import from the grid when no onsite technology, b) value of storage in arbitrating load from peak to off-peak hours, c) excess solar PV is exported to the grid when 
exceeding the load, and d) storage increases the self-consumption of solar PV and minimizes import from the grid in peak hours. The results are based on three sample 
days in May with different solar PV profiles. 
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Fig. 4. Annual cost of purchasing electricity from the grid for the household in the base year (2016). The values are for Reference scenario (i.e., fixed PV and export 
to grid FiTs). 
Table 2 
Main characteristics of financial incentives and storage policies analysed in this study.  
Policy Main feature Solar PV FiT Export to grid FiT Capital 
subsidy 
Storage discharge FiT Retail electricity tariffs 
Reference Fixed FiT for PV generation 
and export to grid in each year 
0.0438 £/kWha 0.0491 £/kWh – – As usual 
Dynamic export 
tariff 
Varying export to grid FiT 
based on hourly or time-of-day 
prices of electricity 




scaled by 0.3273c 
– – As usual 
Self-consumption 
bonus 
Enhanced PV self-consumption 
FiT with no generation FiT 
Self-consumption 
0.1 £/kWha,b 
0.0491 £/kWh – – As usual 
Storage policy Payment for storage discharge 
and penalty for charging in 
peak hours 
0.0438 £/kWha – – Peak time discharge: 0.0491 
£/kWh 
peak time charge: 
− 0.0491 £/kWh 
off-peak: 0 
As usual 
Capital subsidy Compensating a part of initial 
investment of storage device 
0.0438 £/kWha 0.0491 £/kWh Three 
variants: 30, 
60, and 90% 




Smart increase of retail prices 
at peak hours and lowering 
them in off-peak time 
0.0438 £/kWha – – – Increased peak prices and 
lowered off-peak prices in 
ToU and dynamic tariffs 
Enhanced storage 
policy 
Same as "storage policy" but 
with a time-of-day varying 
payment/penalty scheme 
0.0438 £/kWha – – Applying a price multiplier 
of 0.3273c 
(positive for peak-time 
charge, negative for peak- 
time charge, and zero for off- 
peak) 
Increased peak prices and 
lowered off-peak prices in 
ToU and dynamic tariffs  
a The value is given for the first year of analysis, declining over years and ceased in 2040. 
b This is derived from the sum of revenues from original solar PV FiT (0.0438 £/kWh) and export FiT (0.0491 £/kWh) divided by the reduced annual electricity 
import due to self-consumption. For a prosumer with PV-only (without battery), this PV self-consumption tariff yields the same revenues as original PV generation and 
export FiTs. 
c This multiplier is estimated by dividing buying electricity price (i.e., 0.15 £/kWh under the static tariff) by fixed export-to-grid FiT (i.e., 0.0491 £/kWh). 
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costs are 572 £/a. If it operates EES alone, costs are identical to “no- 
technology” because static tariffs do not make energy time-shifting a 
lucrative activity. Annual costs fall by 38% to 355 £/a if the consumer 
only operates a PV system, and by 74% to 150 £/a if it operates both a 
battery and a PV system. Hence, pairing EES with PV implies a reduction 
in electricity bills of 205 £/a, or 63% lower annual costs compared to 
running PV alone. 
3.1.2. Choice of electricity pricing scheme 
Fig. 4 compares the annual cost of buying electricity from the grid for 
three retail tariffs, i.e., static, ToU and real-time (dynamic). The values 
are for the base year under the “Reference” scenario, i.e., assuming fixed 
FiTs for export to grid and PV generation6. Deploying a battery without 
solar PV, i.e., the “storage-only” case, offers significant savings in elec-
tricity bills in ToU and dynamic tariffs, 35% and 25% compared to “no- 
technology”, respectively. In the “PV-only” case, the consumer can 
reduce dependency on the grid by 34–41% depending on the tariff. With 
the installed capacity of PV (4 kW) and the hourly generation pattern of 
PV in 2019 in the examined location (London), the consumer benefit 
from a solar PV generation of 4620 kWh per year. However, without 
storage, the self-consumption of PV for this consumer remains at 31%, 
independent of the tariff. 
Pairing PV with storage offers the highest savings in electricity bills 
compared to “no-technology”, with ToU being the best (84%) and dy-
namic tariff (61%) the lowest. It should be noted the reduction in 
electricity bill is not necessarily showing the best cost optimal scenario, 
as there are other cost components such as technology investment and 
O&M costs, and revenue streams such as export FiT. For example, the 
consumer will be able to exert more price arbitrage under dynamic 
tariffs, resulting in greater electricity imports from and exports to the 
grid (see Appendix D, Fig. H2). Therefore, the import from the grid for 
real-time tariff is higher than static in the PV-storage cases. 
Fig. 5 presents the components of cost and revenue in the house-
hold’s balance sheet, calculated for the ToU tariff and for different 
technology combinations for the base year. The capital cost and future 
replacement and maintenance costs are annualized using a discount 
factor of 5%. As shown by the results, the technology costs comprise a 
Fig. 5. Annualized costs and revenues for each technology choice (no-technology, storage-only, PV-only and PV-storage), under time of use (ToU) tariff, Reference 
scenario in 2016 (the base year for the analysis). The values on the bars show the respective costs or revenues, and the values in bold on top of each bar shows 
the total. 
6 The FiT for solar PV generation was discontinued for PV installations after 
March 2019. However, the previously installed PVs are still entitled for the 
promised FiTs. which is the basis of our analysis for the period of 2015–2040. 
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large portion of the total annual cost of the consumer, being 51% in 
“storage-only”, 65% in “PV-only”, and 92% in “PV-storage”. PV sce-
narios benefit from revenues of generation and export FiTs. However, 
these values are relatively lower than the costs, making the technology 
combination cases neither net profitable nor being more profitable 
compared to “no-technology”. PV-only under ToU offers a near break-
even situation. For comparing these results with those of static and 
dynamic tariffs, the reader may refer to Appendix D. 
The choice of pricing scheme can greatly reduce electricity bills. 
Annual costs associated with ToU, real-time, and static pricing are re-
ported in Table 3 relative to the consumer’s choice of technology under 
static pricing. 
The examined UK consumer if without onsite technology would be 
better-off with ToU rather than static tariffs, saving 19 £/a, experiencing 
3% lower annual bills. ToU pricing implies marginally greater savings 
relative to real-time tariffs, when the consumer operates a technology. 
Where the consumer owns a battery, but not solar PV, annual bills fall by 
37% if ToU pricing is chosen over static pricing, and by 30% if the 
consumer switches from static to real-time tariffs. 
When the consumer operates PV-EES, electricity bills with ToU tar-
iffs are 43% lower relative to the same case with static tariffs. If con-
sumers with PV alone who are on ToU decided to also purchase EES, 
they would cut annual bills by roughly one forth (see Fig. 4). However, 
savings from PV-EES under real-time tariff is lower than that of static 
pricing. As mentioned earlier, this is due to a higher electricity exchange 
with the grid in real-time pricing, i.e., much greater arbitrage, importing 
electricity at low price and exporting back to the grid at higher prices 
later. 
3.1.3. Impact of future electricity prices on consumer’s profitability 
The private value of residential PV and EES depends on the devel-
opment of electricity prices throughout the lifetime of such technolo-
gies. Future electricity prices will directly impact the electricity bill, and 
hence, the economic benefit of the prosumer. Since future prices are 
uncertain, depending on many parameters, including the energy tran-
sition in the country; many studies adopt exogenous assumptions for 
prices to run the cost-benefit analysis, e.g., as done in [62] and [63]. In 
our analysis, we derive future wholesale electricity prices from a power 
system model, explained in Section 2.2.1 and calculate retail prices for 
each tariff. This methodology and the estimated prices are described in 
[43]. 
Fig. 6 compares the annual bill of the consumer in different years. 
The results are calculated for the Reference scenario based on historical 
electricity hourly prices in 2016–2019. The results suggest that the 
annual electricity bill, if adjusted based on the wholesale electricity 
price, varies from one year to another. Fr static and ToU use tariffs, 
where the tariff is calculated based on average prices, the year-to-year 
variations are uniformly observed across different technology choice. 
However, for real-time tariffs with storage, the electricity bill is the 
function of both magnitude of the wholesale price and the price vola-
tility: the higher price volatility between min and max values will result 
in higher arbitrage benefits (see Fig. 6, PV-storage technology in 2018). 
3.2. The financial case for consumers 
We apply a system-based Net Present Value (NPV) for the calculation 
of the financial case of the consumer when investing in different tech-
nologies. Electricity prices in the lifetime of the investment, i.e., 
2015–2040 comprises an important part of the consumer cost. The 
system-based NPV accounts for the development of future electricity 
prices internally, i.e., by deriving these prices using a power system 
model and based on future energy scenarios, as opposed to exogenous 
assumptions (see more details in [43]). 
Fig. 7 reports the NPV of consumer investments by technology and 
electricity tariff. None of the combinations of technology and electricity 
tariffs yield positive values for NPV under current tariffs and technology 
costs. However, comparing with the “no-technology” case, we can 
analyse the economic attractiveness of investment in each technology 
option. Distributed technologies reduce the import from the grid 
significantly, however, EES and PV investments, and the combination 
thereof, are barely reducing the total costs given the high capital costs of 
both technologies relative to the savings they generate. The PV-only 
scenario, however, offers an NPV relatively close to that of “no-tech-
nology” under static and ToU tariffs. Solar PV owners would receive a 
total FiT of 2050 £ in 2016-£ values for the lifetime of investment, 
covering less than 25% of their initial investment of 7800 £ and total 
O&M cost of 1340 £. Investing in EES require 4850 £ (based on Pow-
erwall II market price scaled for lower capacities). The O&M cost of EES 
depends on possible battery degradation and replacement costs in the 
lifetime, varying between 520 and 630 £ if one replacement happens 
after 13 years from the installation. Solar PV is most profitable when 
used in combination with ToU tariffs, namely 4% more profitable 
compared to real-time and static tariffs. 
When investing in EES alone, the consumer will face no Return on 
Investment (ROI) in any tariffs, − 100% in static tariffs, − 22% in ToU 
and − 45% real-time. If the consumer invests in PV-EES, capital costs will 
be the highest across all scenarios. However, storage can help to increase 
self-consumption of PV and reducing the imports. As such, PV-storage 
shows a better NPV compared to storage-alone in static and ToU tariffs. 
Given the high cost of batteries, pairing EES with PV will not make a 
better investment compared to solar PV alone. This would reduce the 
NPV obtained with solar PV alone by between -1100 £ and -2200 £ 
depending on the electricity tariff. 
3.3. Impact of policy incentives on investment 
In this section, we explore how different policy options can improve 
the private value of investing in distributed technologies. We evaluate 
Table 3 
Annual bill savings by technology and electricity tariff relative to the respective technology choice under static pricing. The results are for the Reference scenario.  
Tariff Technology option Annual bill (2016) (£/a) Compared to Static tariff Compared to no-technology Impact of storage 
Savings (£/a) Savings (%/a) Savings (£/a) Savings (%/a) Savings (£/a) Savings (%/a) 
Static No technology 572 – – – – – – 
Storage-only 572 – – 0 0% 0 0% 
Solar PV-only 355 – – 217 38% – – 
PV-storage 150 – – 422 74% 205 58% 
ToU No technology 553 19 3% – – – – 
Storage-only 358 214 37% 195 35% 195 35% 
Solar PV-only 329 26 7% 224 41% – – 
PV-storage 86 64 43% 467 84% 243 74% 
Real-time No technology 535 37 6% – – – – 
Storage-only 400 172 30% 135 25% 135 25% 
Solar PV-only 352 3 1% 183 34% – – 
PV-storage 207 − 57 − 38% 328 61% 145 41%  
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Fig. 7. Cost-benefit of the consumer investment in onsite technologies under Reference scenario for the standard residential building (middle-sized terrace house, 
with electricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown with negative values and revenues with positive. The blue marker and number on each bar show the NPV 
of the investment (NPV = present value of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up by one decimal. 
Fig. 6. Annual electricity bills for different technology options and under different tariffs in 2016–2019 for the “Reference” scenario.  
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the policies introduced in Table 2. 
3.3.1. Dynamic export tariffs 
Current tariffs for exporting electricity to the grid are fixed 
throughout the year. We analyse a tariff design, in which the export 
tariffs are dynamic changing based on the wholesale price of electricity 
announced 24 h ahead. The purpose of this policy is to encourage EES 
owners to optimize their device and export in higher prices, which is a 
signal for scarcity in the market. The results show no significant dif-
ference for ToU and static tariffs, as these are not impact by dynamic 
prices in the market. However, consumers under with real-time will 
improve their financial case under this policy for both storage technol-
ogy options by 9% compared to Reference. However, this policy is not 
capable of making any technology option with storage net profitable (for 
more details see Appendix D). 
3.3.2. Self-consumption tariff policy 
The current export FiT provides a financial incentive to export 
electricity to the grid, but these exports typically occur during periods of 
low electricity demand. Also, PV-EES owners do not benefit from this 
tariff as they can reduce their export of PV by increasing self- 
consumption onsite. We therefore propose to eliminate generation- 
based incentives and enhance the FiT self-consumption tariff in a way 
that would maintain a constant stream of income to consumers with 
solar PV alone. We show how this policy would indirectly improve the 
financial case for EES by increasing rewards to solar PV self-use. 
Fig. 8 shows how this policy could positively affect the NPV for 
consumers investing in PV-EES. While consumers with solar PV alone 
would not be affected by this policy, setting a well-designed PV self- 
consumption tariff would offer net positive value obtained by PV-EES 
1800 £ for ToU tariff and up to 3080 £ for users under real-time tariffs 
compared to the Reference scenario. This is equivalent to 36–57% ROI 
for a residential PV-EES system, depending on the tariff. This increased 
ROI makes PV-EES more profitable than PV-alone in different tariffs, 
which translates into an increase in the value of self-consumption for 
prosumers, or up to 481 £/kWh installed capacity of EES, which is 
effectively equivalent to a subsidy of 68% of incurred battery capital 
costs. 
3.3.3. Price gap widening policy 
Price-gap widening policy, or also known as critical pricing, aims to 
increase the gap between off-peak and peak hours to offer higher po-
tentials for arbitrage to private owners and encourage them to discharge 
at the times prices are high. The results show that this policy can 
effectively make storage a net profitable investment for a consumer 
operating storage for price arbitrage (see Fig. 9, storage-only). This 
policy, without having any capital burden on the regulator, would offer 
a value of 2230 £ to the storage owner in ToU and 3830 £ under real-time 
tariffs. This policy is very favourable for storage-only operators, who can 
capture the highest benefits for price arbitrage, making a ROI of 41% for 
users under ToU and 70% for those under real-time tariffs. The policy 
offers a slightly more moderate, yet significant, savings to consumers 
with PV-storage. The PV-storage operators need to allocate a portion of 
storage capacity for storing solar energy, which makes it less available 
for price arbitrage. Yet, this policy can make storage paired with PV near 
breakeven under the real-time tariff. 
3.3.4. Introducing storage tariffs 
The introduction of a storage tariff for rewarding owners of EES for 
each kWh of electricity discharged at the peak time could improve the 
financial case for EES. The storage tariff is calculated in a way that re-
flects the value created by the EES device relative to an investment in 
solar PV alone, which makes this tariff a function of the type of elec-
tricity tariff. 
Fig. 8. Cost-benefit of the consumer investment 
in onsite technologies under the PV Self- 
consumption Tariff scenario for the standard 
residential building (middle-sized terrace house 
with electricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs 
are shown with negative values and revenues 
with positive. The blue marker and number on 
each bar show the NPV of the investment (NPV =
present value of revenues – present value of 
costs). The NPVs shown on the bars are in 1000-£ 
and rounded up by one decimal.   
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With a moderate storage tariff of 0.049 £/kWh, this policy is effective 
in making storage-only net profitable compared to not having any onsite 
technology, under ToU tariffs. The proposed storage policy can save 
1720 £ for ToU and 2380 £ under real-time tariffs, which makes up to 
40% ROI. This policy therefore indirectly provides further incentives to 
switch to the tariffs which provide the highest savings, i.e., dynamic 
tariffs (see Appendix D for further details). 
3.3.4.1. Enhanced storage policy. We analyse a combination of price-gap 
widening policy and storage tariff introduced in this study, in a new 
policy called Enhanced storage policy. The results show that this policy 
can make storage-only investment net profitable under both ToU and 
real-time tariffs. The consumer can enjoy a discounted revenue of 4050 £ 
under ToU and 5780 £ under real-time tariffs if switching to this policy. 
This means the consumer can cover the entire capital cost of battery 
under real-time tariffs. As Fig. 10 shows, the cost of this policy for the 
regulator is typically lower than the payments for export FiTs. Moreover, 
for PV-storage cases, this policy is the only policy so far that can make 
investment in storage profitable for PV-battery owners (under real-time 
tariffs). 
3.3.5. Capital subsidies 
Given the high capital cost of EES, lowering the upfront cost through 
capital subsidies has a large impact on profitability. The results show 
that while a 30% capital subsidy is barely enough to make storage 
owners reaching breakeven in their investments and only in ToU, a 
capital subsidy of 50–60% can make investment in batteries profitable 
almost for all storage-only and PV-storage tariff combinations (see 
Fig. 11). The capital subsidy is not combined with any preferential tariff 
for energy storage. 
3.4. Comparing different policy options 
The examined policy options have diverse impacts on the profit-
ability of consumers depending on the chosen electricity tariff by con-
sumers and the technology option. Also, each policy has a cost for the 
regulator, or the system operator, to be paid either through incentives 
generally referred to as policy cost. Fig. 12 compares the benefits of 
different policies for consumers investing in storage under real-time 
tariffs with the cost of that policy for the system. The values are based 
on the NPV of benefits and payments during 2015–2040 for each unit of 
storage capacity invested, relative to the Reference scenario (current 
policies). The results show that most of the proposed policies have 
higher benefits for consumers than the cost for the regulator, which 
overall increases the welfare7 in the system. Interestingly, the policies 
have a different performance for storage-only and PV-storage, as the 
owners tend to use storage for two different purposes: price arbitrage for 
the former and increasing PV self-consumption plus price arbitrage for 
the latter technology option. For storage-only investments, the enhanced 
storage policy tariff introduced in this paper offers the highest benefits 
to the consumer, followed by price gap widening strategies. Considering 
the cost of these policies for the system, the net welfare that they 
generate is significant, i.e., 520–540 £/kWh of storage capacity. How-
ever, for consumers pairing storage with their PV, the PV self- 
consumption tariff followed by capital subsidies and storage policies 
Fig. 9. Cost-benefit of the consumer investment 
in onsite technologies under Price-gap widening 
Tariff scenario for the standard residential 
building (middle-sized terrace house with elec-
tricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown 
with negative values and revenues with positive. 
The blue marker and number on each bar show 
the NPV of the investment (NPV = present value 
of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs 
shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up 
by one decimal.   
7 By “system welfare”, we refer to direct costs and benefits of a policy to 
relevant stakeholders, i.e., the consumer and the system operator. We do not 
account for indirect costs and benefits of each policy, e.g., in terms of the 
changes in the welfare of central power producers. 
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are more economical choices. 
Considering the cost and benefits of the policies, the self- 
consumption tariff and storage policy generate the highest welfare for 
the system. Capital subsidy of 60% has the highest cost for the system, 
making such capacity-based incentives net-zero in terms of welfare 
generation. The results for consumes under ToU tariff show that dy-
namic, price-based storage policies offer the highest value if the user 
adopts storage without pairing with PV (storage-only case) (see Fig. 13). 
However, when paired with PV, the proposed storage policies based on 
price gap offer no significant benefits, and for both “price gap widening” 
and “enhanced storage policy”, the cost for the system is higher than the 
benefit for consumers. Because in ToU tariffs with only two timespans 
(peak and off-peak), retail electricity prices remain unchanged for most 
of the hours, i.e., from 7 AM until midnight. Therefore, storage will be 
mainly used for increasing PV self-consumption with limited opportu-
nity for price arbitrage. This conflict of benefit from night-to-day price 
arbitrage and keeping storage capacity for shifting solar generation from 
daylight to evening peaks, makes the storage policies less attractive for 
PV-storage owners, compared to adopting storage alone. 
The results show little potential for consumers under static tariff to 
benefit from storage policy options proposed based on time-of-the-day 
prices, making capital subsidies best policy for this type of tariffs. 
Table 4 shows the impact of the considered policies on the financial case 
for the consumer when investing on a EES system for all three tariffs and 
storage technology options. The results show the return on investment 
(ROI) on storage, change in the NPV compared to the Reference sce-
nario, and change in the cost of the policy compared to the Reference 
scenario. The cost of policy is calculated based on additional tariffs and 
subsidies that the regulator must pay to the consumer investing in EES. 
As the results show, the system cost of policy is in most cases, like 
subsidies, equal to the private gain of the storage owner. However, there 
are some cases that a policy creates higher benefits for the consumer 
compared to the cost for the system operator. For example, in the price- 
gap widening scenario and for real-time tariffs, the gain of consumer is 
between 60% to more than 7-fold higher than the tariffs that the regu-
lator needs to pay. In some cases, like the storage policy, both consumer 
and the regulator gain positively from the proposed policy, under real- 
time tariffs and PV-storage. Subsidies of 60% show the highest cost in 
the examined policies in this comparison. The enhanced storage tariff 
offers almost double savings to consumers (5780 £ cf. 2870 £), with 19% 
lower cost for the system compared to 60% capital subsidy. 
PV self-consumption tariffs and the implementation of a storage 
tariff show to be the most effective policies in terms of added benefits for 
consumers for each unit of cost carried over by the regulator. Finally, 
switching from static to ToU and further to real-time tariffs can improve 
the system’s profitability considerably for the policies that are targeting 
to optimize the performance of residential PV-storage with respect to 
electricity price signals in the wider power system. A 50–60% capital 
subsidy (~2500–2700 £) is enough to enable PV-EES to reach profit-
ability compared to current-day policies. 
The proposed enhanced storage tariff is shown to be among the most 
effective policies to improve the profitability of EES for consumers with 
only storage at their site, offering a ROI of 74–105% depending on the 
tariff. 
3.5. Sensitivity analyses 
To verify the robustness of our results, we calculate the sensitivity of 
NPV of PV-storage subject to changes in nominal discount rate; capital 
cost of solar PV; O&M cost of solar PV; and capital cost of the battery. 
The sensitivity analyses indicate that the financial case for PV-EES is 
mostly sensitive to the capital cost of technologies, and the least by the 
Fig. 10. Cost-benefit of the consumer investment 
in onsite technologies under Enhanced Storage 
Tariff scenario for the standard residential 
building (middle-sized terrace house with elec-
tricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown 
with negative values and revenues with positive. 
The blue marker and number on each bar show 
the NPV of the investment (NPV = present value 
of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs 
shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up 
by one decimal.   
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O&M costs. Generally, our sensitivity analysis, summarized in Table 5, 
indicates that 33% reduction in the capital cost of battery will make PV- 
EES systems net profitable under current market conditions (Reference 
scenario). More importantly, assuming zero capital cost for the battery 
shows a NPV of 677 £ for each kWh installed battery. This can be an 
indication of the cost of the battery that can result in breakeven between 
costs and benefits. This includes the battery unit cost, installation, and 
20% VAT. 
3.5.1. Different building sizes with different electricity demand 
The results so far presented the financial case for a standard building, 
medium sized, three bedrooms with 3750 kWh load per year. We run 
simulations for a range of different residential buildings with different 
load values to examine the profitability of the examined technology 
options with respect to the size of the building. The UK Electricity Sur-
vey Data [45] has classified UK households with their annual electricity 
demand ranging from 3080 kWh for small terrace house to 4400 kWh for 
large private houses. We analyse consumer loads for a range between 
2750 and 6000 kWh to cover all possible cases. We apply the same 
hourly load pattern but scaled based on the annual load of the house-
hold. We do not explicitly model the future changes in the load pattern, 
e.g., due to electric vehicle charging, which is one of the limitations of 
this study. 
Fig. D6 in Appendix D compares the NPV of investing in battery for 
seven different building types, based on the annual load of the building 
and the electricity tariff of the consumer. The results show that the 
battery size (6.4 kWh) examined in this study shows better NPV in 
buildings bigger than the standard type examined here (3750 kWh). For 
ToU tariff, if the residential building would have an annual load of 
greater than 5250 kWh, the battery will be already net profitable when 
pairing with PV. The result indicates that the size of batteries in the 
market (6.4 kWh and 12.3 kWh for Tesla Powerwall variants) are rela-
tively large for the size of most buildings in the UK, considering a solar 
PV capacity of 4 kW (more details in Appendix D) 
3.5.1.1. Solar PV Self-consumption. Increasing solar PV self- 
consumption is one of the objectives of prosumers to reduce their 
import from the grid. Also, the system operator benefits from self- 
consumption as this will ensure a smooth operation of the distribution 
grid at peak sunny hours, eliminating the grid management cost for 
coping with excessive export of electricity from homes to the grid in 
short periods, as noted in different studies [64,65]. Increasing self- 
consumption improves the economic value of the PV system for the 
prosumer as export tariffs are usually much smaller compared to buying 
electricity from the grid. Mckenna et al. [66] analyses a large dataset of 
solar PV data from different countries, concluding that self-consumption 
depends mostly on the amount of solar electricity generated and the 
amount of electricity consumed during the day. Fig. 14 shows the PV 
self-consumption for different building sizes and the role of storage in 
increasing self-consumption. These values are for a 4-kW PV installation, 
and if storage is used, the battery size is 6.4 kWh. For the standard 
building analysed in this study (load = 3750 kWh), pairing PV with 
battery almost doubles the self-consumption from 31% to 59–60% for 
consumers under ToU and static tariffs. However, those consumers 
running PV-storage with real-time tariffs would experience a lower self- 
consumption rate (see Fig. 14 (1)). This is due to the use of storage for 
price arbitrage in some hours when the price gap is so large that out-
competes the use of storage capacity for self-use of solar PV generation, 
resulting in exporting solar PV to the grid. 
Fig. 11. Cost-benefit of the consumer investment 
in onsite technologies under 60% Capital Subsidy 
for the battery, for the standard residential 
building (middle-sized terrace house with elec-
tricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown 
with negative values and revenues with positive. 
The blue marker and number on each bar show 
the NPV of the investment (NPV = present value 
of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs 
shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up 
by one decimal.   
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Fig. 12. Net present value (NPV) per unit of installed storage capacity under different policy options. The profit for consumers is compared to the cost of that policy 
for the regulator (under real-time retail electricity tariffs). Consumer benefit is the difference in the NPV of investment in storage compared to the Reference scenario. 
Policy costs show the relative difference in the discounted FiTs and subsidies paid by the regulator compared to Reference. Net welfare = consumer benefit – policy 
cost. Calculations are based on solar PV size of 4 kW, storage size of 6.4 kWh, and building annual load of 3750 kWh. 
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Fig. 13. Net present value (NPV) per unit of installed storage capacity under different policy options. The profit for consumers is compared to the cost of that policy 
for the regulator (under time-of-use (ToU) retail electricity tariffs). Consumer benefit is the difference in the NPV of investment in storage compared to the Reference 
scenario. Policy costs show the relative difference in the discounted FiTs and subsidies paid by the regulator compared to Reference. Net welfare = consumer benefit – 
policy cost. Calculations are based on solar PV size of 4 kW, storage size of 6.4 kWh, and building annual load of 3750 kWh. 
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3.5.2. Location of the building and solar PV irradiance 
The analysis of the storage policy options so far was focused on a 
location in London. To understand the impact of latitude and solar 
irradiance on the revenues of prosumers from their PV and PV-storage 
technologies, we examine five different locations in the country, 
namely Brighton, Birmingham, London, Manchester, and Edinburgh, 
with annual solar PV capacity factors ranging between 11 and 14% 
(2019) from south to north (hourly data from [67]). 
The results show that the latitude has direct impact on the profit-
ability of investment in solar PV, either alone or combined with storage. 
Among the examined cities, Brighton is the most southern one, in which 
the NPV of investing in solar PV under ToU and static tariffs will be 
already net positive in the Reference scenario. On the other end, Edin-
burgh shows the lowest NPV of investment in PV and PV-storage 
compared to the other cities. If a consumer in this high-latitude city 
invests in solar-PV, the NPV of the investment will be -4200 £ compared 
to no technology onsite. This is almost 50% lower compared to London, 
the location for the case study of the paper, where the NPV of investment 
in PV-storage is -2200 £ compared to having no technology under the 
Reference scenario. These results can be seen in Appendix D. 
However, if we compare the value of storage paired with PV under 
the proposed enhanced storage policy, the cities in higher latitudes show 
greater savings compared to the Reference scenario for the same city 
(see Fig. 15). This happens because storage capacity can be more 
favorably used for price arbitrage, hence, making up for some part of 
lower PV generation in higher latitudes. In summary, the NPV of in-
vestment in PV-storage in Edinburgh is still lower than London, for 
example, in all examined scenarios. But switching from PV-only to PV- 
storage in Edinburgh has 18% savings for the consumer compared to 
that of 16% in London under dynamic FiT-based storage policies. 
3.5.3. Optimal sizing of storage and benefits from policies 
For the examined consumer type (load 3750 kWh/a), the Power-
wall1 battery (6.3 kWh) is too large. The results show that due to a mix 
between low insolation and magnitude of electricity consumption, the 
operating cost of electricity will not fall should the consumer purchase 
an additional battery or a battery with higher capacity, such as Tesla’s 
larger Powerwall2. 
The optimal maximum battery size for the average UK consumer is 
3.1 kWh, almost half of the 6.4 kWh usable battery capacity examined in 
this paper (=Tesla Powerwall1). Therefore, a battery with half the 
original capacity (3.2 kW) and, assuming a linear relationship between 
capacity and capital costs, costing half the original price, would offer 
breakeven in costs and revenues even under the Reference scenario (see 
Fig. 16 (a)). We also show the optimal size of the battery for one of the 
proposed policies, i.e., enhanced storage policy in Fig. 16 (b), which 
indicates that a smaller-sized battery with 3–4 kWh capacity would have 
offered more profits compared to the examined case study. Other studies 
have confirmed this finding that the optimal size of residential batteries 
in high-latitude countries is smaller than commercial products in the 
market for most households (for example see [68]). Tesla Powerwall II 
battery with a size of 12.3 kWh is not profitable for any building size 
listed in the UK Consumer Electricity Survey under the Reference sce-
nario but shows positive NPV for buildings with an annual load of 
greater than 5250 kWh under the proposed enhanced storage policy (see 
Fig. 16 (b)). Therefore, it is important for residential distributed tech-
nologies to be sized correctly to optimize the financial case for the pri-
vate user. 
Fig. 17 shows the NPV of storage as a function of size of the PV and 
battery for two scenarios. In the Reference scenario (Fig. 17 (a)), the 
value of PV-storage is maximized when the size of storage (kWh) is half 
of the annual load (here 3.75 MWh), and half of the PV capacity (kW). 
For the standard building examined in this study, the size of storage (6.4 
kWh) seems to be large, and a storage size of 2–3 kWh seems to be most 
optimal. Under the enhanced storage policy (Fig. 17 (b)), the house-
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positive value region. For example, for a PV size of 3 kW, a battery size of 
6.4 kWh can be paired with net positive return (however, the optimal 
battery size is approximately 4 kWh). Because in this policy, the unused 
capacity of battery after PV self-consumption can be employed in price 
arbitrage and increasing the profits of the owner. 
4. Discussions and policy implications 
4.1. Storage and consumer electricity bills 
4.1.1. Storage decreases annual electricity costs 
Self-consumption of PV electricity increases considerably with EES 
for a typical UK consumer. EES substantially decreases the cost of 
electricity imports from the grid, except for those under a static tariff 
regime. By pairing a battery to a solar PV system, consumers can reduce 
annual electricity bills by up to 84% (467 £/a) if combined with ToU 
tariffs. 
While EES decreases annual electricity bills, the high capital costs 
make it an unprofitable investment under current market and tariff 
conditions. Considering the system benefits that EES can provide, pol-
icies aiming to improve the attractiveness of such investments will be 
increasingly valuable as the share of domestic PV capacity increases in 
the power system and self-consumption is becoming more important. 
The efficacy of these policies is discussed hereafter. 
Results obtained for lower-latitude countries may be different from 
those reported in this study. The amount of solar PV generation will 
determine the utility of the battery to the consumer, hence the battery’s 
profitability. Solar generation, on the other hand, depends on insolation, 
which can be approximated by the country’s latitude. We show that in 
higher latitudes the profitability of PV stand-alone system decreases. 
However, pairing solar PV with EES, and employing the unused capacity 
of EES for arbitrage will compensate for the loss of expected gain from 
solar self-consumption in higher latitudes. 
Bhandari et al. [69] finds that insolation generally has the larger 
impact on the profitability of solar PV . The results of policy analysis can 
therefore vary significantly across from different latitudes. However, if 
consumer electricity prices would be high, like that of Germany, the PV- 
EES investment will be net positive value for the prosumer due to 
significantly less dependency on the grid. By analysing a range of pol-
icies, we show that the regulator can design retail tariffs more flexibly to 
reflect hourly dynamics of wholesale prices in them, encouraging con-
sumers to deploy their storage capacity to offer load levelling and peak 
shaving. 
4.1.2. Dynamic electricity tariffs for domestic users 
Dynamic tariffs, including ToU and real-time tariffs, provide the 
highest cost savings to consumers deploying EES, under tariff-based 
policies analysed in this paper. More consumers on time-of-use tariffs 
would make the retail price more reflective of the wholesale cost, which 
would in turn make consumers (especially those more reliant on the 
grid) more dependent on wholesale cost fluctuations. In early 2016, 
Fig. 14. Solar PV self-consumption with and without storage for different building sizes and consumer electricity tariffs under Reference scenario. The installed 
capacity of solar PV is 4 kW, battery is 6.4 kWh, and the location is the London area. 
Table 5 
Sensitivity analysis: change in net present value (NPV) of investing in a PV-storage system. The values are under ToU tariff, for PV-storage technology option (4 kW PV 
and 6.4 kWh battery), and under the Reference scenario.  
Input variable Initial value Net present value (NPV) per unit of installed storage capacity (£/kWh) 
Decreasing input variable by Increasing input variable by 
− 100% − 66% − 33% +33% +66% +100% 
Nominal discount rate 5% 696 444 62 − 497 − 858 − 1249 
Capital cost of storage 712 (£/kWh) 677 401 34 − 436 − 712 − 997 
Capital cost of solar PV 1866 (£/kW) 1064 661 121 − 563 − 969 − 1384 
O&M cost solar PV (including inverter) ~90 (£/kW/a) 50 − 21 − 113 − 228 − 299 − 370  
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Fig. 15. Impact of the proposed storage policy on the profitability of prosumers with PV-storage systems in different cities with different solar irradiance. The results 
show the change in the net present value (NPV) of investment in storage device of 6.4 kWh, compared to the Reference scenario. 
Fig. 16. The combined impact of building size (electricity demand of the building) and storage size on the net present value (NPV) of investment in storage when 
paired with Solar PV (size of solar PV of 4 kW). The standard building size examined as the case study in this paper is shown with the circle, orange marker. The NPV 
is the difference between NPV of PV-storage and that of PV-only for consumers under real-time electricity tariffs. 
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California approved Net Metering 2.0, a policy which will require new 
solar homeowners to switch to ToU rates8 [70], which could be bene-
ficial even for consumers who do not operate EES or PV. Our results 
confirm this, showing that installing storage (without PV) under ToU 
tariffs will reduce the electricity bills of consumers by 35%. If storage 
paired with PV, the electricity bills can decline by 74% compared to PV- 
alone, and by 84% compared to having no technology onsite. 
4.1.2.1. Designing ToU and real-time tariffs. Retail electricity prices 
consists of wholesale electricity prices plus network fees and system 
taxes and levies. Whether savings from EES are higher with ToU or real- 
time tariffs depends on the tariff levels at times of positive residual load, 
i.e., overproduction of solar electricity. EES-led annual bill savings can 
be higher for consumers on ToU and real-time tariffs, compared to 
existing tariffs, if the ratio between the peak and off-peak tariff will be 
wide enough to make price arbitrage by EES profitable. This price gap 
can be designed by the regulator by distributing network fees and taxes 
unevenly between different hours of the day, for example, charging 
Fig. 17. The net present value (NPV) of the investment in storage when paired with Solar PV as a function of solar PV capacity and storage size. The standard 
building size examined as the “case study” in this paper (building annual load = 3750 kWh) is shown with the circle, brown marker. The NPV is the difference 
between NPV of PV-storage and that of PV-only for consumers under real-time electricity tariffs. 
Fig. 18. Comparing the gap between peak and off-peak electricity prices averaged for each hour of the day for one year. This gap is an indication for the potential 
value of price arbitrage by electricity storage. Wholesale electricity prices are relevant for utility-scale storage while time-of-use (ToU) and real-time prices for 
residential storage (home battery). 
8 http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3800 
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higher taxes and fees at peak hours compared to off-peak. Implementing 
real-time tariffs that can increase the arbitrage value of EES implies 
monitoring the wholesale electricity prices during periods of high de-
mand and setting the hourly real-time tariff level during these periods 
higher relative to the wholesale prices. The retail prices can be updated 
on a rolling basis when wholesale electricity prices are cleared in the 
day-ahead market. Fig. 18 shows the potential value of arbitrage for 
residential consumers under current ToU tariffs, which is already 80% 
higher than that value based on the wholesale prices. The real-time tariff 
shown in this figure generates the same average electricity bill as ToU, 
however, with a much higher arbitrage value for EES. The regulator can 
intensify the gap between peak and off-peak retail prices (so called, 
critical pricing), to reflect the need for storage at the distribution grid 
level, which is not typically accounted for in wholesale prices. This 
widened price gap offers an enhanced arbitrage value to residential EES, 
three times that of in the wholesale market, for load levelling and peak 
shaving in the system. 
4.1.3. Size of battery and consumer savings 
The Tesla Powerwall1 battery capacity is substantially larger than 
the optimal size for the needs of a standard UK electricity consumer 
(annual load 3750 kWh/a). Consumers in the UK and high-latitude 
countries could benefit from lower battery sizes since this may main-
tain a higher utilization level of EES . Our analysis for different building 
sizes shows that a ratio of 80% between battery capacity in kWh and 
annual load of the building in MWh is the maximum threshold for EES 
being net profitable under current market conditions. This means, for a 
terrace house with the annual load of 5 MWh, the suitable size of battery 
is approximately 4 kWh, which is much smaller than current commercial 
batteries like Tesla Powerwall 2, with 12.3 kWh storage size. 
Given the low charge levels ordinarily achieved by the studied 
consumer-operated battery, policies aimed at supporting higher battery 
capacities or improving battery efficiency are irrelevant toward 
improving the battery’s use, or its profitability to consumers. Additional 
battery capacity or enhanced efficiency may typically not improve the 
value of EES in high-latitude countries due to high electricity con-
sumption and low insolation. However, we show that if policies 
enhancing the arbitrage values of EES will be in place, such as critical 
pricing of retail tariffs or enhanced storage tariff discussed in this paper, 
higher sizes of the battery can be profitable too. Under such policies, the 
storage owner can capture synergies between PV self-consumption and 
peak shaving, or load levelling, with their battery creating private and 
system-level benefits. 
4.2. Consumer’s financial case for solar PV and EES 
EES can reach profitability in the current market conditions if it will 
be able to provide more energy market services aside from arbitrage 
alone. There can be a trade-off or synergy between the EES used for 
private and system-wide utility. Encouraging consumers to adopt EES- 
only technology onsite could provide self-sufficiency, as well as flexi-
bility services to the system. The financial case for EES will depend on 
the ability of the system operator to nudge consumers into foregoing the 
discharge of their electricity at those times that the system needs most, 
which could help the system operator to minimize system costs, making 
decentralized EES useful in the provision of balancing, load levelling, 
and peak shaving services. Under current FiTs, pairing EES with PV 
increases the overall cost of the system for the consumer relative to PV 
alone leading to a net loss. With higher price volatility, the provision of 
storage services for the grid, and battery innovation-driven declining 
costs, it could be possible for the integrated PV-EES system to become 
profitable, and even more profitable than PV alone. 
Based on the examined system, battery cost reduction or value 
enhancement events (such as those described above) could lead to the 
Table 6 
Comparing different policies analysed in this study with respect to their main characteristics, advantages, and complexities.  




Consumer perspective/ ease of 
uptake 









Direct incentive for self- 
consumption 
Straightforward: 
- net metering of annual 
load, PV generation, and 
imports from the grid. 
FiT over many year Moderate (optimizing battery 
for self-use of solar PV) 
481 − 166 
Dynamic export 
tariff 
Hourly export FiT based 
on market prices of 
electricity 
Moderate: 
- hourly metering of import/ 
export, 
- communicating hourly 
tariff levels to consumers 
FiT over many year, 
adjustable 





Critical pricing of peak 
and off-peak prices in 
consumer tariffs 
Easy: 
- hourly metering of 
import–export 
Retail tariffs over 
many year, 
adjustable 
Complexc 304 − 193 
Storage policy Rewarding storage 
discharge at peak hours 
Moderate: 
- hourly metering of storage 
charge and discharge 
- communicating hourly 
tariff levels to consumers 
Retail tariffs over 
many year, 
adjustable 




Combination of critical 
pricing and storage 
policy 
Moderate: 
- hourly metering of storage 
charge and discharge, 
import and export 
- communicating hourly 
tariff levels to consumers 
Retail tariffs over 
many year, 
adjustable 
Complexc 369 − 235 
Capital subsidy 
(60%) 
Subsidizing 60% of the 
investment cost of 
battery 
Straightforward One-off capital cost Easy (no uncertainty related to 
future prices, and no need for 
optimal operation of the 
battery) 
448 − 448  
a Difference in the net present value (NPV) of investment in PV-EES compared to the Reference scenario. 
b Difference in the cost of implementing the policy compared to the Reference policy (negative sign shows payments, and positive sign shows gains). 
c The consumer needs a battery management and optimization system to maximize the benefits from price arbitrage and PV self-consumption. The operation of 
battery will depend on hourly electricity prices and the generation of solar PV electricity each day. Also, there is uncertainty in estimating the benefits, if future 
electricity prices are unknown and the regulator does not guarantee the tariffs for long term. 
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NPV of solar PV and that of the integrated PV-EES system to equalize. 
For example, should the capital cost of batteries including installation 
fall to 369–541 £/kWh (depending on the consumer electricity tariff), 
the NPV of solar PV alone and that of solar plus EES would converge. 
This is 25–48% lower than the cost of battery today (assuming 712 
£/kWh). 
An investment in solar PV, EES, or both, is unprofitable for the 
average UK consumer under current policy and market arrangements. 
Whether, or how quickly, PV-EES will become more profitable than PV 
alone will depend on how policy accommodates EES, both directly and 
indirectly through supporting PV. 
4.3. Storage policy and investment incentives 
We analyse a range of policies that can enhance the profitability of 
EES for residential applications, both stand-alone and paired with solar 
PV. The proposed policies include, an enhanced PV self-consumption 
tariff, retail price gap widening scenarios, and energy storage policies. 
The issue for residential EES in high-latitude countries is the low 
daytime electricity demand, rather than low solar generation. In hot 
climate countries, peak demand is during the day for air conditioning, 
while it occurs during the evening in colder countries such as the UK. 
Consumers in these countries tend to export electricity to the grid at 
times of low demand, so their value to the system is lower than if their 
PV systems were paired with EES, which can make PV-generated elec-
tricity available to the system when it is more valuable. We propose that 
the regulator would eliminate PV generation FiT in favour of a PV self- 
consumption bonus. For a typical consumer, eliminating generation and 
export-to-grid incentives can not only reduce electricity to be injected to 
the grid when it has a low value, but can also improve the self- 
consumption of PV electricity by consumers, reduce the burden of 
consumers’ PV on distribution networks, and, as we have shown, 
improve the economic attractiveness of EES. This policy could be 
reserved to consumers who pair solar PV with EES and could be posi-
tively viewed by consumers because it has a net positive present value 
equal to 481 £/kWh for consumers under real-time tariffs. This return on 
investment is almost 70% of the capital cost of the battery. We have 
proposed a methodology for converting an existing generation FiT to a 
new PV self-consumption FiT, which would maintain the same benefits 
as generation FiT if consumers operating PV-alone (without EES). 
We propose dynamic export FiT based on indexing the FiT on 
wholesale prices. This tariff is easy to implement as it does not require 
any behind the meter technology for metering or complex calculation. 
The user can employ their storage to export at times of high export 
prices, which can be announced a priory. This simple policy can save up 
to 200 £/kWh installed capacity of EES, which is equivalent to a 30% 
capital subsidy. More importantly, our results show that this policy has 
no additional cost for the regulator, compared to a fixed export tariff; 
hence, offering net positive value for both consumers and the system. 
Furthermore, we investigate some policies for regulating retail prices to 
widen the gap between peak and off-peak prices. These pricing mech-
anisms show to be among those with a high net present value for PV-EES 
owners, equivalent to 304 £/kWh installed battery. The system operator 
can benefit from this simple policy for example for load levelling and 
peak shaving. 
A tariff paying EES providers for their ability to shift electricity in 
time could result in a more extensive deployment. We propose a storage 
tariff that could reward the value of EES to the system, by paying 
Fig. 19. Yearly charge and discharge of home battery in different hours of the day. The values are the sum of hourly operation of storage in a year for a PV-battery 
system (PV = 4 kW and battery = 6.4 kWh) for two different policies but for the same building. 
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incentives for the discharge of storage at peak times. This policy was 
shown to offer net positive value to consumers from their investment. 
The policy prioritizes the discharge of electricity from residential bat-
teries for grid services (e.g., reducing peak or contingencies and/or load 
levelling) over solar PV self-consumption alone. This means at some 
hours the consumer will be encouraged to export solar PV generation to 
the grid instead of storing that for their later use, while at some other 
hours this export to the grid will not be rewarded at all. 
4.3.1. Policy implementation and consumer perception 
The dynamic policies introduced here, which depend on hourly 
wholesale electricity prices, could be positively seen by domestic users 
as they offer positive net revenues from investment in storage paired 
with PV. However, there can be uncertainties in the level of price-based 
FiTs in the future, i.e., in years and decades to come. The system oper-
ator needs to design storage tariffs based on wholesale electricity prices 
or considerations related to the grid contingency management to be able 
to optimally reward consumers. This entails uncertainties as to future 
prices are not known and estimating benefits can be difficult and 
complicated both for the regulator and consumers. Model-based ana-
lyses and cost-benefit application can help consumers to understand 
these uncertainties and dependencies. Moreover, some storage policies 
should consider the trade-offs between higher current electricity prices 
to encourage the uptake of EES and lower future peak prices as the share 
of EES grows in the system. The net effect will depend on the ability of 
the system operator to jointly maximize private and system benefits, 
hence its ability to employ consumers’ EES resources. 
To overcome this challenge, i.e., sending right signals to residential 
consumers to invest in EES and operate their storage at times most 
valuable for the system; many studies have proposed the central coor-
dination of EES by an aggregator or the system operator itself [12]. 
However, this represents a privacy issue as consumers may be reluctant 
to give away the control of their devices and perceive security risks for 
their home apparatus [71]. The storage FiTs proposed in this study have 
two advantages over central coordination. First, these policies do not 
need aggregation or virtual control of home batteries, hence, alleviating 
the risk of privacy-related reluctancy of consumers. Second, these stor-
age tariffs empower consumers to benefit from retail price gaps and 
arbitrage value designed for end users, which is way greater than utility- 
scale value of arbitrage for central EES (see Fig. 18). More importantly, 
the regulator can accommodate any distribution grid related consider-
ations in the tariffs, which are not typically possible to be reflected in 
wholesale prices derived at large price areas or at the national level. 
The storage tariff can be designed in two ways: in a first embodiment, 
a fixed amount can be paid to storage providers based on the amount of 
electricity discharged at certain times of the day. This price can be 
chosen ex-ante based on an optimal price that would meaningfully 
stimulate deployment of the technology. A second possibility is for each 
consumer to be paid a different price based on the system value of 
flexibility, or the system cost of providing alternative marginal flexi-
bility at a given hour of the day at a specified location. This case would 
be complex to solve and would require the use of often big distribution- 
level data. More significantly, tariff differentiation based on the location 
of consumers in the ditribution grid may be illegal in some power system 
jurisdictions. One solution is to offer different storage tariffs for different 
locations, reflecting the distribution grid needs, so that consumers can 
choose the tariff optionally based on their choice of distributed tech-
nology. Otherwise, it is recommended that a storage tariff would be 
designed in a similar way to PV generation and export tariffs, which are 
based on simple criteria such as unit size, presence of energy efficiency 
certification, time-of-day metering, etc. 
Finally, we note that policies aiming to nudge consumers into 
switching tariffs have the least impact on the profitability of EES at 
present but may become relevant as capital costs fall over time. Yet, 
capital costs will only fall if there is widespread deployment, and an 
initial push could be decisive in providing confidence to those 
consumers considering an investment in EES. Table 6 summarizes the 
main features, advantages and complexities of the storage policies 
examined in this study. 
4.4. Residential PV and electric vehicles 
In this analysis, we did not explicitly model the role of electric ve-
hicles on the residential PV-EES system. The possibility of using an EV 
with V2G capability as an alternative to a separate household EES to 
combine with PV is another option for increasing self-consumption [72]. 
The functionality would be very similar to a standard household EES 
when the EV is connected bidirectionally to the residential power cir-
cuit; charging when the PV panel is producing and discharging at night 
and in periods of low solar insolation. Clearly there would be some re-
strictions based on the presence of the vehicle at the building site and the 
householder’s need for the EV to have a certain required charge level 
according to their mobility needs. However, the typical size of EV bat-
teries –averaging around 50 kWh (as equipped in the cheapest version of 
Tesla Model 39) is considerably more than the EES options studied here, 
i.e., 6.4 kWh. This indicates that a significant margin of the EV battery 
capacity would be available at most times, while a smaller household 
EES may still be needed as a buffer and also to cover daily needs if the EV 
is not present.10 
Fig. 19 shows the charge and discharge of electricity in one year for 
each hour of the day for the modelled standard building. The results are 
shown for two scenarios: The Reference scenario including the existing 
policies (left) compared to a storage policy proposed in this study. The 
results show that there are typically two cycles of charge–discharge, one 
from nights to morning peaks and the second operating cycle from PV 
generation time to evening peaks. The enhanced storage policy (Fig. 19 
(right)) shows the same pattern, however, with much higher frequency 
and amount of charge and discharge per year due to larger price gaps 
compared to Reference. The EV has a potential here to link the first 
storage cycle to the second, i.e., by charging the EV at night, using the 
vehicle during the day, and plugging back the remaining charging to the 
grid in evenings; when the owner returns home, there is no sun, and the 
electricity demand and prices are still high. 
On the policy options for promoting V2G-based EES with PV, an 
interesting possibility for study could be adaption of existing subsidies 
for EVs (currently a maximum of 3000 £ in the UK). If these capital 
subsidies were redirected or banded according the V2G capabilities of 
the vehicles, with a further premium for combination with residential 
PV, the net government expenditure on subsidies could be minimized 
compared to implementing separate support policies for EVs and 
household PV-EES systems. The capital subsides for EVs could even be 
directly re-orientated towards the costs of the necessary electrical in-
stallations necessary for bi-directional connection between the EV and 
household power system. However, this synergistic option towards the 
promoting dual objectives of both increasing electromobility and resi-
dential PV self-consumption could be worth investigating. One technical 
barrier at present is that only one V2G-compatible EV is available on the 
consumer market, the second generation Nissan Leaf [73], and even in 
this case, the V2G-capability is available only with the installation of 
extra equipment, currently only used in test operation in Japan [72]. 
However, this is likely to change into the future and incentives for V2G- 
equipped vehicles would likely increase vehicle manufacturer offering 
to the private car market. 
9 https://www.tesla.com/en_eu/model3  
10 A number of optimization measures would be required – e.g., reduced 
charging of the car in advance of expected PV power being available and 
adapting the charging speed of the vehicles in line with the PV production – e. 
g., the current Tesla Model 3 has a minimum charging current of 6A, equating 
to 1540 W in the UK residential setting (converting power to 110 V could 
reduce the minimum compatible charging power to closer 700 W). 
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4.5. Drawbacks and future work 
We only evaluated economic incentives for the consumers in their 
investments in solar PV with EES. Yet wider consumer preferences can 
be an important determinant of the adoption of distributed technologies. 
Consumers may wish to adopt EES for security reasons, environmental 
friendliness or simply because they are enthusiastic early adopters, and 
their decisions are not always based on measurable costs and benefits. 
Moreover, consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about 
the future [74], neglecting consumer psychology other than their ability 
to choose between technology performance and costs. 
The same EES device could be used for arbitrage at certain times and 
for security at other times, especially for the consumers in off-grid areas 
or locations with a vulnerable grid. The value of the security option is 
not considered in this study and would constitute a valuable extension of 
this work. In-house EES could provide ancillary services in the future, 
but these potential revenue streams have not been considered in this 
paper. Aggregated EES has recently competed successfully in Capacity 
Market auctions and has provided Enhanced Frequency Response ser-
vices [75]. However, optimal planning of EES for making aggregated 
revenues from different services in combination with arbitrage services 
is a complex issue and not considered here. We did not model EV 
charging and V2G possibilities as a potential EES device to be paired 
with PV. The future work can examine this, including the impact of EV 
charging on the hourly load pattern of the building, which we did not 
cover in this paper. 
5. Conclusions 
By applying a soft-linking modelling approach, we analyse the 
impact of different incentive mechanisms on the profitability of invest-
ing in solar PV and electricity storage technologies for a residential 
electricity consumer in the UK. Substantial savings on annual electricity 
bills could be achieved by prosumers if they were to pair their solar PV 
systems with batteries. These savings would be maximized with time-of- 
use (ToU) and real-time tariffs, rather than static, depending on the 
prevailing incentives for solar PV generation, export-to-grid, and self- 
consumption. 
This paper shows that electricity storage would provide 25–35% 
annual electricity bill savings when adopted stand-alone. More signifi-
cantly, storage offers 41–74% savings when paired with PV, compared 
to PV-alone. These ranges depend on the type of the retail electricity 
tariff. Combining solar PV and storage without policy intervention, 
however, is not economically profitable under current market condi-
tions and incentives for solar PV. 
We analyse the provision of financial incentives targeting electricity 
storage based on the system-level benefits of the technology, contribu-
tion of storage in self-consumption of PV onsite, and the cost of each 
policy for the regulator. We propose three types of policies, including, 
solar PV self-consumption bonus, dynamic retail pricing mechanisms, 
and a ‘storage policy’. The storage policy is to reward consumers for 
each kWh of electricity discharged from their storage device at times 
needed by the system. This policy shows to be among the most effective 
for improving investments in distributed PV-battery systems, especially 
if combined with enhanced pricing mechanisms. In a enhanced pricing 
mechanism, the regulator can design tax and network fees – which are 
usually added as a fixed premium on top of hourly wholesale electricity 
prices – on a dynamic basis, or so called a “critical pricing” mechanism. 
This will generate an hourly retail price that reflects the system needs, 
including the contingencies in the distribution grid, which are not 
typically reflected in the wholesale prices. This redesigned, dynamic 
retail price can guide home batteries for a charge and discharge regime 
that is beneficial for the system. 
In addition, we propose replacing PV generation tariffs by a PV self- 
consumption incentive. We demonstrate that the economic case for a 
solar PV-battery system can be greatly improved under this altered 
tariff, as battery increases self-consumption of renewable energy onsite. 
We demonstrate a calculation method for deriving the PV self- 
consumption bonus without deteriorating the benefits of prosumers 
with solar PV alone (without storage onsite). The proposed self- 
consumption tariff offers a net present value to consumers equal to 
70% capital subsidy for battery. This policy can be applied in other high- 
latitude countries, where prosumers with solar PV alone tend to export 
electricity back to the grid during hours of low electricity demand. We 
find that typical prosumers in high-latitude countries operating both PV 
and storage may benefit from smaller-sized batteries than those 
currently in the market. Self-consumption policies, however, incentivise 
prosumers with a PV-battery system to reduce their dependency on the 
grid, with significantly less electricity imported from or exported to the 
grid. Therefore, the incumbent utility companies or retail firms may not 
benefit from the energy transition towards a decentralized energy sys-
tem, where their "trade" based revenues will decline as self-sufficiency of 
prosumers improves. 
Capital subsidies are among the easiest policies to implement, while 
being the costliest. More importantly, with capital subsidies the system 
operator is not necessarily able to employ the residential energy storage 
resources optimally for the system needs. The most effective policy 
measures to improve the economic profitability of storage for prosumers 
are those combining dynamic retail tariffs with a pricing mechanism for 
rewarding storage discharge at times system prices are high, as a proxy 
for the more urgent needs in the system. We show that such storage- 
oriented policies are economically net positive investments for con-
sumers and have much less costs for the system compared to capital 
subsidies. However, the sucess of these storage policies depends on 
reducing complexity of the battery management and optimization at the 
consumer side, and minimizing the uncertainty in expected revenues of 
electricity storage in future years by offering flexible, long-term and 
transparent retail electricity tariffs to prosumers. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A presents sources of data and assumptions used for the electricity dispatch model, including electrical energy storage (EES) operation 
and constraints, as well as heat pump (HP) and thermal energy storage (TES) constraints. Appendix B represents the operational constraints of a central 
EES in the system, e.g., pumped hydro storage (PHS). The methodology for calculating wholesale and retail electricity prices is reported in Appendix C. 
Appendix D provides the methodology for the consumer’s electricity cost minimization problem. Appendix E reports the methodology to calculate the 
PV self-consumption tariff, whereas Appendix F shows some of the results. 
Appendix A. Calculating retail electricity prices 
The wholesale prices are calculated in the electricity dispatch model based on the system demand and a merit ordered supply curve based on short 
run marginal costs of available generators. The market knows the residual system demand, i.e., Lnet(t, d) for t = 1,⋯,T and the available capacities of 












⎠, (A1)  
where: 
w = 1,⋯,M – generator index; 
typew – generation technology type w; 
Kw – available capacity of technology w; 
pwSRMC – short run marginal cost of technology w. 
Output: Wholesale prices, given by: p(t) = (p1(t),⋯pH(t) ) for i = 1,⋯,H. 
The matrix M is ordered in an ascending order of price pwSMRC. Then, for t = 1,⋯,T, we perform the following sequential operations:   
a. Set j←0, ϱ = Lnet(t)
While (ϱ > 0)  
Do { 
ξ+ = min(e,Gen[j,2] ) – power bought  
cost(t) + = ξ+∙Gen[j, 3] – cost of purchase  
ϱ − = ξ+ – remaining demand to fulfil  





}    
Retail electricity prices 
Wholesale prices are then transformed into retail electricity prices, πa(t, d), by assuming a real-time mark-up on short-run marginal costs that is 
consistent with the following equation: 
πa(t, d) = p(t, d)⋅lanet(t, d)⋅ka (A2) 





















where πhis is the average historical retail price for electricity [£/MWh]; πa is the retail price for consumer a; t,T is the time step counter and maximum 
number of time slices in a day, d and Γ are the day counter and maximum number of days in a year. Referring to Eq. (A2) allows us to calibrate the real- 
B. Zakeri et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Applied Energy 290 (2021) 116697
27
time mark-up, kat . 
Appendix B. Consumer’s cost optimization problem 
A linear programming model has been developed to minimize the operating cost of the consumer for running onsite technologies and paying 
electricity bills. This problem is dependent on the consumer’s choice of technology and electricity tariff. 
In the “no-technology” case, with neither a battery nor a solar PV system, the consumer simply pays the relevant electricity tariff. When only 
owning a battery, in the TOU tariff, the battery will be charged during off-peak hours (24–7 h) at the lower night-time tariff (0.07 £/kWh), and then the 
maximum available electricity from the battery is consumed during peak hours (7–24 h), when prices are higher (0.16 £/kWh), until the battery is fully 
discharged. When consumer has only solar PV installed, the consumer simply utilizes electricity from solar when this is available, at a zero-marginal 
cost, and exports the extra electricity to the grid for saving on its daily operating cost. Lastly, when customer owns both a battery and a solar PV 
system, at times when PV generation exceeds the load, any excess electricity is utilized to charge the EES device. Once the battery is fully charged, the 
remaining electricity is then exported back to the grid. In simple terms, electricity that is stored during the day is used during the evening when solar 
generation falls below the load level, thereby providing the consumer with additional savings by avoiding relatively expensive imports from the grid, 
which can be shown to maximize self-consumption from the PV system. 
Using an hourly resolution, where t = 1,⋯,T, the EES device is modelled with a nominal power rating P (in kW), the max storage content of S (in 
kWh). The overall efficiency (ηtot) represents the losses during charging and discharging. Eq. (B1) shows the dynamic relationship between the 
electricity loaded to EES at the charging mode (Echa(t)) and discharged electricity at a time step (Edis(t)) in kW, relative to the state of charge of the EES 
device (SoC(t)), and l(t) storage self-discharge in time t: 
SoC(t) = Echa(t) −
Edis(t)
ηtot
+ SoC(t − 1)*l(t) (B1) 
This modelling approach is based on price arbitrage, which is applied when the electricity prices are known to a price taking EES. Hence, decision 
variables are the amount of charge and discharge of the EES device at each time step, which are elated to the state of charge (SoC) of EES. Other 
parameters affecting the profit of the owner of the PV-EES, such as solar PV generation, grid electricity prices, and grid time-of-use tariffs are not 
controlled or affected by decisions of a price-taking EES. The objective function is shown in Eq. (B2). The calculations can be done at each half-hour or 






Lnet(t)Cel(t) +Edis(t)Cstor(t) − Egrid(t)Fgrid(t) (B2)  
where d shows days in the optimization horizon (e.g., a whole year Γ = 365); t is each modeling time slice in a day, e.g, for an hourly analysis ς = 24; 
Lnet is the net electricity bought from the grid (kWh) and Cel is the price of electricity (£/kWh); Cstor is the operational cost of discharging one unit of 
electric energy from EES (£/kWh) and Egrid is the exported electricity to the grid (kWh); and Fgrid is the price of electricity sold to the grid or so called 
export FiT (£/kWh). 
Storage policies 
For storage policies modelled in this paper, when storage discharge receives a payment from the regulator, the objective function will slightly 
change as shown in Eq. (B3), where Fstor is the storage discharge FiT as function of time steps and Kstor is the penalty for charging storage at a certain 






Lnet(t)Cel(t) +Edis(t)(Cstor(t) − Fstor(t))+Echa(t)Kstor(t) − Egrid(t)Fgrid(t) (B3) 
The objective function is subject to the following constraints. The net load is calculated through an energy balance presented in Eq. (B4), where Lact 
denotes the actual load of the household, and Epv(t) is the net solar PV electricity (in kWh) at time step t. 





Eq. (B4) ensures that if solar PV production exceeds load and EES charging capacity, the surplus would be sold to the grid. Moreover, since the price 
of export to the grid is always lower than the cost of purchasing electricity from the grid, it is not possible for the household to bypass electricity, 
meaning that eitherLnet or Egrid would be zero at each time step. Eq. (B5) and Eq. (B6) control the energy content and power capacity at charge/ 
discharge of the EES system and ensure they are less than the maximum values of the selected technology: 
∀t SoC(t) ≤ SoCmax = S (B5)  
∀t Edis(t) ≤ P,Echa(t) ≤ P (B6)  
where S is the maximum size, or capacity, of the EES device (kWh), and P is the maximum power rating of EES11 device (kW). All variables are positive 
in this formulation, as shown with Eq. (B7): 
∀t 0 ≤ Epv(t),Edis(t),Echa(t), SoC(t),Lact(t), Lnet(t),Egrid(t) (B7)  
11 If the maximum power rating in charging and discharging mode would be different, the formulation should be written separately for each operating mode to 
accommodate that. 
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The model is run for different technology combinations and types of electricity tariffs, from year 1 to year 26, or from 2016 to 2040. The EES device is 
assumed to be a price taker in this model, so price arbitrage decisions have no impact on grid electricity prices. This assumption holds true as we use 
the storage capacity required in the system determined by the power system model. 
Appendix C. Calculating PV self-consumption tariff 
We propose a policy measure for promoting solar PV self-consumption through PV-EES, which is based on an enhanced self-consumption tariff (s). 
In this Appendix, we show how an existing solar PV generation and/or export tariff (hereafter called original tariffs) can be converted to a self- 
consumption tariff. For this policy not to negatively impact holders of stand-alone solar PV technology, this policy must be designed in a way that 
the level of revenues to these consumers can be kept equivalent to original tariffs over the lifetime of the solar panels as expected by consumers. For 
achieving this goal, we derive the total level of income from solar PV alone over the lifetime of the device, k, as the sum of original generation and 
export tariffs, which both can be changed independently from year to year (e.g., a digressing PV generation tariff). Therefore, the original revenues of 
consumer with PV-alone can be derived by discounting future revenues to present value through Eq. (C1): 











where k, kg, andke are the present values of total FiTs, PV generation FiT, and export FiT, respectively.G(y) is the annual generation of electricity from 
solar PV in year y; E(y) is the annual electricity export to the grid in each year; y = 1,⋯,Y = 26 years; r is the discount rate; g(y) is the PV digressing 
generation tariff, which is digressing and falls to zero from year y = 20 onwards; g(y) in each year is linked to the RPI, i, and q(y) is the compound rate 
for digressing indexation. If the government were to change the length of the tariff, this would be reflected by simply using the new generation tariff in 
g(y), or the export tariff in e(y), and updating those values for Y. e(y) is the export tariff, which falls to e(20)p.a.2 from y > 20 years; e(y)*(1 + i)q(y) is 
the digressing FiT tariff changing with retail price index (RPI), where q(y) is the compound inflation rate; and in y = 21, there is no RPI indexation, 
meaning that q(21) = 0 in this case. Considering S(y) is the yearly self-consumption of solar PV, the total expected revenues from this tariff (ks) can be 







The original generation tariff g(y) can be related to the proposed self-consumption tariff s(y) with a multiplier (ω(y): 
s(y) = g(y)*ω(y) (C3)  



























for y = 1,⋯, yg + 1 (C5) 
Hence, the new self-consumption tariff in each year (y) which enables solar PV consumers to achieve original income, in the absence of incentives 












for y = 1,⋯, yg + 1 (C6)  
And 
s(y) = g(y) = 0 for t = yg + 2,⋯,Y (C7) 
We remark that both the static and ToU electricity tariff cases do not present any differences, since the only condition for these to differ is that they 
present dissimilarities in the term g(y), since an identical g(y) is required to obtain the same level of income k. 
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Appendix D. Additional modelling results 
In this Section, we present some of the modelling results that were not shown in the main article. Fig. D1 shows the consumer cost-benefit results 
for adopting different technologies under static tariff and current FiT policies for export to grid and solar PV generation. Fig. D2 shows the same results 
for dynamic tariffs. 
Fig. D3 shows the results of NPV analysis for the “Dynamic Export Tariff” policy (see Fig. D4). 
Fig. D5 shows the NPV of investing in solar PV and solar PV-storage in different cities in the UK. The values are for the Reference scenario and are 
the difference in NPV after investing in onsite technologies compared to the case of no-technology in each respective city. 
Fig. D6 shows the NPV based on the size of building under different tariffs and the Reference scenario. 
Fig. D1. Total annualized costs and revenues for each technology choice (no-technology, storage-only, PV-only and PV-storage), under static tariffs, and assuming 
the current policy scenario for the base year (2016). Feed-in tariff (FiT) payments are for electricity generation and export. The values on the bars show the respective 
costs or revenues, and the values on top of each bar shows the total cost or revenue. 
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Fig. D2. Total annualized costs and revenues for each technology choice (no-technology, storage-only, PV-only and PV-storage), under dynamic tariffs, and assuming 
the current policy scenario for the best year (2016). Feed-in tariff (FiT) payments are for electricity generation and export. The values on the bars show the respective 
costs or revenues, and the values on top of each bar shows the total cost or revenue. 
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Fig. D3. Net present value (NPV) of the consumer investment in onsite technologies under Dynamic Export Tariffs for the standard residential building (middle-sized, 
3 bedrooms, with electricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown with negative values and revenues with positive. The blue marker and number on each bar 
show the NPV of the investment (NPV = present value of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up by 
one decimal. 
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Fig. D4. Net present value (NPV) of the consumer investment in onsite technologies under Storage Policy Tariffs for the standard residential building (middle-sized, 3 
bedrooms, with electricity load of 3750 kWh/a). The costs are shown with negative values and revenues with positive. The blue marker and number on each bar show 
the NPV of the investment (NPV = present value of revenues – present value of costs). The NPVs shown on the bars are in 1000-£ and rounded up by one decimal. 
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Fig. D5. Net present value (NPV) of investment in PV and PV-storage in different cities under the Reference scenario, compared to the case of consumer with “no- 
technology” in the same location. 
Fig. D6. Net present value (NPV) of investment in energy storage relative to the case of no storage, for different building sizes and three electricity tariffs. (NPV of 
storage-only is compared with no-technology; NPV of PV-storage is compared with PV-only). 
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